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Abstract 
Disinvestment, in the sense of project termination and liquidation of assets including the 
cession of a venture, is an important realm of entrepreneurial decision-making. This study 
presents the results of an experimental investigation modeling the choice to disinvest as a 
dynamic problem of optimal stopping in which the patterns of decisions are analyzed with 
entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs. Our experimental results reject the standard net present 
value approach as an account of observed behavior. Instead, most individuals seem to 
understand the value of waiting. Their choices are weakly related to the disinvestment triggers 
derived from a formal optimal stopping benchmark consistent with real options reasoning. We 
also observe a pronounced ‘psychological inertia’, i.e., most individuals hold on to a losing 
project for even longer than real options reasoning would predict. The study provides 
evidence for entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs being quite similar in their behavior. 
Keywords:  Real-Options, Disinvestment, Exit Behavior, Experimental Economics 
ii Serena Sandri, Christian Schade, Oliver Mußhoff, and Martin Odening 
SiAg-Working Paper 2/2 (2010); HU Berlin 
Zusammenfassung 
Desinvestitionsentscheidungen, im Sinne von Projektabbruch und Liquidation, stellen einen 
sehr wichtigen Aspekt der unternehmerischen Praxis dar, für den nach wie vor ein erheblicher 
Untersuchungsbedarf besteht. Diese Studie präsentiert die Ergebnisse einer experimentellen 
Untersuchung bei der eine Desinvestitionsentscheidung als dynamisches Optimal-Stopping-
Problem mit unterschiedlichen Volatilitäten modelliert wird. Darüber hinaus werden die 
Entscheidungen von Unternehmern denen von Nicht-Unternehmern gegenübergestellt. Die 
experimentellen Resultate werden mit den normativen Vorhersagen der traditionellen und der 
neuen Investitionstheorie (am Beispiel des finanztheoretischen Gegenwartskonzeptes bzw. 
des Realoptionenansatzes) konfrontiert. Die experimentelle Ergebnisse lehnen die deskriptive 
Validität des finanztheoretischen Gegenwartskonzeptes ab und deuten auf die signifikante 
Korrelation zwischen dem Verhalten im Experiment und den Vorhersagen des Realoptionen-
ansatzes hin. Die Befunde liefern darüber hinaus Evidenz für psychologische Inertia, die mit 
dem Status-Quo-Phänomen in Verbindung gebracht werden kann. Die Studie zeigt weiterhin 
die leichte Tendenz von Unternehmern auf, eher als Nicht-Unternehmer an einem laufenden 
Projekt festzuhalten. 
Schlüsselwörter: Realoptionen, Desinvestition, Exit-Entscheidungen,  
experimentelle Ökonomie 
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1. Introduction 
This study investigates the disinvestment behavior of entrepreneurs when choices are 
irreversible.1 In spite of the importance of such disinvestment decisions, including termination 
of projects and entrepreneurial exit, this topic still received insufficient attention in 
entrepreneurship research (DeTienne, 2008; McGrath, 1999; O’Brien and Folta, 2009). This 
study aims at deepening our understanding of this choice situation by investigating, via an 
experiment on asset liquidation, the timing of abandoning a project with risky returns. 
Concerning entrepreneurial disinvestment choices, there is mostly anecdotal evidence of 
founders “dying in the saddle” rather than selling their venture “under price” as well as of 
young entrepreneurs developing their project by burning their own and the aunt’s bank 
account instead of terminating their business idea. There is only one example of an empirical 
study providing results on the reasons why entrepreneurs hold on with an under-performing 
business, the study by DeTienne, Sheperd, and Castro (2008). 
With the main aim of further understanding the reluctance to “pull the plug” on a business, 
perhaps sticking to it for too long and postponing its termination and selling of underlying 
assets, this study empirically tests whether an optimal stopping approach consistent with real 
options reasoning provides a suitable theoretical framework according to which the tendency 
to postpone exit and termination choices can be rationalized. Indeed, real options theory 
provides a microeconomic explanation of the reluctance to leave a losing activity such as an 
under-performing firm. Specifically, real options theory exploits the analogy between a 
financial option and a real (dis)investment. It asserts that a firm may increase its profit by 
deferring an irreversible disinvestment even if the expected present value of the firm’s cash 
flow falls below the liquidation value. The intuitive reason is that in cases of irreversible 
decisions waiting has a positive value since new information about the expected cash flow 
arrives in subsequent periods. As long as the disinvestment has not been realized – the “plug 
has not been pulled” – a decision maker has the flexibility to continue with an ongoing project 
that could prove to be valuable in case the cash flow increases again. Termination of the 
project (the firm) ‘kills” this option and reduces the decision maker’s flexibility. The loss of 
this flexibility must be covered by the liquidation value, too, before a disinvestment becomes 
optimal.   
This mechanism described by real options theory results in a kind of inertia, which has been 
called a “tyranny of the status quo” (Dixit 1992). It is a tyranny based on rational considera-
tions, however. We are experimentally testing this explanation against behavioral accounts for 
waiting with a disinvestment for too long. Hence, our contribution over and above the study 
                                                          
1  An irreversible decision can be defined as a decision which “shrinks the space of available options” (Ramani 
and Richard, 1993), or in other words a decision evoking an outcome that cannot be reversed at least in the 
short term (Henry, 1974) and / or for free (Pyndick, 1991). 
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of DeTienne et al. (2008) is that we empirically disentangle a ‘rational’ from a ‘psychological’ 
component of such a postponement.  
In the same experimental setting we test both disinvestment behavior of high-tech 
entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs, relying thus on the experimental method as a way of 
analyzing entrepreneurial behavior (for an overview of such attempts, see Schade and 
Burmeister-Lamp, 2009). Testing not only the responses of non-entrepreneurs might be 
considered important as professionals could be expected to be more acquainted than non-
entrepreneurs with investment tasks and to rely on different decision heuristics and strategies 
(Busenitz and Lau, 1996; Busenitz and Barney, 1997; Parlich and Bagby, 1995; Olson, 1986; 
Forbes, 2005; Koellinger et al., 2007; Cooper et al. 1988; Burmeister and Schade, 2007). 
So far, in order to explain inertia in investment decisions, research has often focused on 
biased decision-making of managers mostly discussing psychological drivers of this behavior, 
such as sunk-cost fallacy (Ross and Staw, 1993) and escalation of commitment (Staw, 1981) 
(see also DeTienne et al., 2008). In a similar vein, Burmeister and Schade (2007) postulate 
and experimentally demonstrate that entrepreneurs and managers fall prey to a status quo bias 
(Burmeister and Schade, 2007). Only few recent theoretical contributions in entrepreneurship 
have tried to develop a rational account for inertia in investment decisions by evaluating the 
value of waiting for incoming information in tune with real options reasoning (e.g. O’Brien et 
al., 2003, for entry and O’Brien and Folta, 2009, for exit decisions). 
Again, this study tackles the problem of empirically disentangling the two very different 
perspectives on inertia in entrepreneurial disinvestment decisions: an ‘options-based’ inertia 
consistent with real options reasoning, i.e., rationally considering the value of waiting, and a 
‘psychological inertia’ in the sense of a potential bias. We pursue this research aim by running 
experiments on irreversible project termination, observing also whether individuals behave 
differently under the conditions of different volatilities. The high volatility case is also tested 
with high-tech entrepreneurs. Our experimental setting further permits to test the effect of risk 
propensity on disinvestment timing in a framework that explicitly models the tradeoff 
between the risks associated with staying in the running project and that associated with 
terminating it too early.  
The experimental examination of ‘options-like’ situations is still in its beginning, so that also 
in this regard the present research moves on a relatively unexplored terrain. To the best of our 
knowledge, the present study is the first experimental contribution dealing with disinvestment 
behavior in an optimal stopping framework. It is also the first study that additionally measures 
risk propensity in either an investment or disinvestment experiment. From a theoretical 
perspective, risk propensity is important in both situations. When rationally considering 
investment choices, risk aversion should induce the postponement of entry time so that 
potential effects of ‘psychological inertia’ and risk propensity overlap. Considering the choice 
to disinvest, risk aversion works in the opposite direction as will be shown in the theory 
section.  
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The motivation of this study is that disinvestment encompasses a broad and important 
spectrum of entrepreneurial choices, ranging from the decision to terminate a project, to 
liquidate assets in order to reorganize the business, up to the cession of a venture. In spite of 
its relevance, empirical research is scarce concerning the dynamics and the drivers which 
inspire, at the entrepreneurial level, the decision to disinvest as well as its timing. The already 
mentioned exception is the contribution of DeTienne et al. (2008) which explores, relying on 
conjoint analysis, factors explaining the decision to keep on an unprofitable business 
depending on entrepreneurs’ individual thresholds. However, this study does not allow to 
empirically disentangling rational from psychological explanations for inertia in disinvestment 
choices.  
As already pointed out, one example for irreversible disinvestment decisions of entrepreneurs 
is exit.2 As other disinvestment choices, exit choices are no deterministic decisions and they 
do not only relate to the business profitability but also to the options available to the 
entrepreneur.3 A considerable amount of resources are reallocated as a consequence of 
entrepreneurial exit, firm disappearance, and / or transfer having profound implications for the 
industry and the economy (DeTienne, 2008; Holmberg, 1991). It is important for policy 
makers to better understand business exit and transfer.4  
Even if we interpret disinvestment in the more conventional sense of a decision on whether or 
not to terminate a specific project, these decisions are often momentous. Stopping a project 
too early might imply large foregone chances, stopping it too late might imply depleting the 
oftentimes scarce monetary resources of the entrepreneur. Hence, disinvestment decisions 
with respect to specific projects are critical for the success of a business venture as well as 
important for the development of a specific industry. Managerial and policy implications, 
however, largely depend on whether most of the inertia in disinvestment and exit decisions 
has to be attributed to an economically rational form of waiting or to waiting as a bias. A bias 
should be cured (if possible), rational waiting should not.  
                                                          
2  Entrepreneurial exit can be defined as “the process by which founders of privately held firms leave the firm 
they helped to create; thereby removing themselves, under varying degrees, from the primary ownership and 
decision-making structure of the firm” (DeTienne, 2008, p. 2). In particular, there are different exit strategies, 
different reasons for exit and (within a certain interval) flexibility with respect to the exit time. Furthermore, 
each of these aspects might be differently characterized in the context of the various phases of the 
entrepreneurial process (DeTienne, 2008). It is thus clear that only “a greater understanding of the 
entrepreneur will provide insights into the process of entrepreneurial exit” (DeTienne, 2008, p. 2) and that it 
won’t be possible to gain a deeper and more realistic view on this process without explicitly focussing on 
decisions of the individual entrepreneur as the unit of analysis. 
3  The decision to exit a business has been argued to emerge from a highly context dependent and subjective 
mixture of motivations (for more on entrepreneurial motivation see Shane et al., 2003), intentions (Krueger et 
al., 2000), opportunity costs, options (McGrath, 1996), aspirations and goals (Sarasvathy, 2004). 
4  For the example of Europe, it is estimated that approximately one third of the entrepreneurs will leave their 
business within the next ten years and that while transferring a business within the family is still the most fre-
quent case, the number of sales to third parties is increasing (European Commission, 2006). 
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The analysis is articulated as follows: First, the benchmark model to which the study refers 
and the propositions that can be derived on its basis are presented. A discussion of the 
behavioral hypotheses of psychological inertia and salience of high volatility situations as 
well as the characterization of the experimental setting then follow. The experimental findings 
for both entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs are then presented and confronted with the 
benchmark propositions as well as the behavioral hypotheses. This inspires some concluding 
remarks and implications of the study, also exploring potential reasons as to why 
entrepreneurs might perhaps benefit from behaving the observed way outside the laboratory. 
Limitations of the present investigation and perspectives for further research conclude. 
2. Benchmark model and propositions 
A value of waiting is present in various decision problems that are characterized by 
irreversibility, risk, and flexibility. In this paper we describe the value of waiting in the 
context of a simple disinvestment problem. Without a loss in generality5, we consider an 
already existing project with a finite lifetime of three periods that currently earns an annual 
cash flow 0X . The cash flow follows a binomial tree, i.e., in period 1 the cash flow will either 
increase by a value 0h  with probability p or decrease by h with probability 1-p. In period 2 
the cash flow can take the values hX 20   with probability 2p , hX 20   with probability 
 21 p  and 0X  with probability  pp 12 .6 We first assume a risk neutral decision maker 
who has to decide whether to continue or to abandon the project. Termination of the project 
yields a salvage value L in addition to the cash flow of the current period. The project cannot 
be restarted once it has been terminated, that means the decision is irreversible. Traditional 
investment theory asserts that the project should be terminated if the liquidation value 0XL   
exceeds the continuation value Cˆ . Hence the decision rule is:   001 ˆ;ˆmax: FXLCD  , 
where 
(1)  
      
          202002
1
000
21122
1ˆ




qLhXpXpphXp
qhXphXpXC
  
Herein  rq  1
11  is a discount factor and r  denotes an interest rate. Decision rule D1 
essentially means that stopping the project is preferable if the salvage value L exceeds the 
                                                          
5  Qualitatively identical results can be derived for an infinite time horizon.  
6  In contrast to standard options models we assume an additive model of risk instead of a multiplicative one. 
The additive model has been chosen for the subsequent experiments because it is easier to handle for the 
respondents in a multiperiod framework. The hypotheses that we derive are valid for an additive as well as 
for a multiplicative model of risk. 
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expected value of the discounted cash flows, where the expectation is build on information 
available in period 0. The decision is simply a comparison between the two alternatives 
“continuation of the project” and “termination of the project in period 0”.  
The situation is different if the decision on the termination of the project can be deferred  
to period 1. Using financial wording the decision maker now has an abandonment option  
in period 0 that he / she can either exercise or keep alive until maturity (period 1 in this  
case). Deferring the decision has the potential advantage that it allows to take into  
account information arriving in period 1. Of particular interest is the situation where 
hXrLhX  00 , which implies that continuation (termination) is the favorable 
decision if the cash flow in period 1 increases (decreases). In this case the optimal stopping 
rule becomes: 
(2)   002 ~;~max: FXLCD  ,  
with a continuation value 
(3) 
      
       2002
1
000
12
1~




qLXppLhXp
qLhXphXpXC
  
Note that in contrast to the previous decision rule, the second term on the right hand side of 
(3) addresses the continuation and the termination of the project, respectively, depending on 
whether an upward or downward movement of the cash flow occurs in period 1. Thus, the 
myopic decision rule 1D  differs from the optimal stopping rule 2D , in general. First of all, the 
classical net present value of the project, 0ˆF , is less than or at most equal to 0
~F , which is 
sometimes called the strategic (expanded) net present value (Trigeorgis, 1996). Moreover, 
decisions built on theses strategies may deviate. This becomes obvious by comparing the 
respective disinvestment triggers. A disinvestment trigger marks the threshold level of the 
cash flow where it becomes optimal to disinvest. In each period the decision maker compares 
this normative threshold with the realization of the random cash flow. As long as the actual 
cash flow is larger than the disinvestment trigger, the project should be continued. The 
disinvestment triggers can be derived by equating the continuation value and the termination 
value and solving for 0X . (A numerical example for the application of a disinvestment trigger 
is given in section 5 below in the context of our experiment.) According to 1D , the project 
should be terminated if the current cash flow falls below  
(4)   



 qphrLX 1
1112ˆ 0 . 
The optimal disinvestment trigger referring to 2D  is: 
(5) 



 qp
qphrLX 2~0   
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The difference between the two triggers amounts to 
(6)        01
21~ˆ
00 

qpq
qpphXX . 
Apparently 0
~X  is smaller than 0Xˆ  as long as 0p . The above reasoning leads us to the 
following two propositions: 
P1: Rational disinvestment behavior is determined by decision rule 2D  and the 
according disinvestment trigger given in (5). 
P2: A rational decision maker, obeying 2D  will tolerate lower cash flows before 
immediately terminating a running project compared with a myopic decision maker 
who follows 1D  and thus ignores the value of waiting. 
So far the myopic and the optimal decision rules have been derived assuming a risk neutral 
decision maker. In the context of financial options this assumption is not restrictive as the 
resulting prices and exercise strategies are independent of the risk preference of the decision 
maker7. However, in the context of real options risk preferences come into play at least if it is 
impossible to set up a replicating portfolio of traded assets that duplicates the stochastic 
outcome of the (dis)investment project under consideration (see Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). 
Such a duplication is difficult in most real-life decisions on non-financial options and it is also 
(made) impossible in our experiments. The valuation of the risky prospects can then be 
conducted, for example, in an expected utility framework either by replacing uncertain 
outcomes by their certainty equivalent or by using risk-adjusted discount rates. Let rr *  
denote the risk adjusted discount rate and ** 1 rq  . Then the modified disinvestment 
triggers for the myopic decision maker and the rational decision maker read as: 
(7)   



 *
**
0 1
1112ˆ
q
phrLX  
(8) 



 *
*
**
0 2
~
qp
qphrLX , 
respectively. A comparison of (4) and (5) with (7) and (8) shows that risk aversion increases 
the disinvestment trigger of both decision rules. 
Even though this change has no impact on the validity of our propositions, the effects of risk 
propensity can be taken into account as explicated in Proposition 3: 
P3: The larger an individual’s risk aversion, the earlier the disinvestment occurs. 
                                                          
7  Note that the calculation of arbitrage-free option prices is based on ‘risk-neutral’ probabilities instead of 
actual probabilities as in our model (see Hull, 2006). 
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In other words, the more risk averse the individual, the higher his / her disinvestment trigger, 
meaning that he / she would consider disinvestment when investment returns are, for a risk-
neutral individual, still too high to leave the ongoing investment. 
Our optimal stopping problem has been formulated in the spirit of real options reasoning 
whilst keeping the decision situation somewhat realistic and the degree of complexity at a 
level that can still be implemented in the laboratory. Real options reasoning applies whenever 
there is risk concerning future developments, when costs are at least partially irreversible, and 
when there is flexibility with respect to time. It has been applied to a variety of economic 
settings8 and some authors have also discussed the applicability of real options reasoning to 
entrepreneurial decision-making.9 Real options reasoning has also been used to capture the 
strategic nature of entrepreneurial creation of wealth (McGrath, 1996) and postulated as a way 
of managing the costs of entrepreneurial failure (McGrath, 1999). In particular, if applied to 
entrepreneurial exit decisions, real options reasoning provides a framework in which (part of) 
the effect of sunk costs on future decisions can be interpreted as rationally considering the 
potential to recover them (O’Brien and Folta, 2009). 
Several studies (e.g. Ingersoll and Ross, 1992; Paddock et al., 1988) postulate the advantages 
of new investment theory, which in essence relies on emphasizing the role of risk and 
irreversibility for investment behavior.10 In spite of its interesting practical implications, 
direct empirical testing of real options reasoning is still lacking (for an overview see, e.g., 
Hinrichs et al., 2008). It is difficult to collect proper data, partly because of the complexity of 
the model (which admits analytical solutions only for certain specifications of the underlying 
stochastic processes), partly because most of the model’s components either emerge from 
subjective valuations or are represented by variables that cannot be directly observed 
(Odening et al., 2004). 
Some authors argue that the above limitations also “make (…) [real options] impractical as a 
general decision-making aid for most business managers” (Busby and Pitts, 1997, p. 170). 
Those and additional reasons why real options reasoning might not be applied in management 
decisions are also discussed by Adner and Levinthal (2004). Our position is far less radical. 
We believe that the value of waiting makes sense for most individuals also intuitively, and we 
are interested in how close such intuitive behavior of entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs can 
be approximated by a rational model capturing the value of waiting in the sense of an 
‘options-based’ inertia or whether waiting is more in tune with ‘psychological inertia’ as 
explicated in the next section. 
                                                          
8  Real options reasoning has been, e.g., applied to environmental and agricultural economics (Arrow and 
Fisher, 1974; Pietola and Myers, 2000; Purvis et al., 1996; Richards and Patterson, 2004), to land conversion 
and conservation intervention (Titman, 1985; Quigg, 1993), as well as to the economic policy of reforms 
(Dewatripont and Roland, 1995). 
9  It has been, e.g., applied to business incubation (Hackett and Dilts, 2004), organizational resource investment 
(Bowman and Hurry, 1993), and intergenerational transfer (Miljkovic, 2000). 
10  There is also empirical evidence supporting the similarity between patterns of firms’ entry and real options 
dynamics (Caves, 1998). 
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Our experimental approach allows implementing all features of our benchmark model and all 
parameter values chosen, hence encompassing measurement problems and deviations from 
model assumptions in decisions outside the laboratory. From our perspective, the research aim 
of disentangling ‘options-based’ and ‘psychological’ components of inertia can only be 
tackled relying on the experimental method, as it permits to obtain data under controlled 
conditions and to disentangle the different origins of inertia from the potential effects of risk 
preferences. 
As mentioned in the introduction, the experimental investigation of the real options approach 
is still at an early stage: Closest to the spirit of our investigation is a recent paper by Oprea et 
al. (2009) that analyses whether individual behavior in an investment setting might, by 
learning, approximate the optimal exercise frontier for available options. Further, Rauchs and 
Willinger (1996), focusing on how increased expected information affects subjects’ choices, 
provide evidence for an irreversibility effect, while Sirmans and Yavas (2005) try to elicit, in 
a very simple setting, subjective valuations for an option by asking the participants to submit 
a bid for it. Another options-related design is discussed in Barner et al. (2005) that focus on 
information arrival and aggregation in an experimental asset market. 
3. Behavioral Hypotheses 
The benchmark propositions stated in Section 2 rely on the interpretation of human decision 
making as fully rational and are based on Bayesian optimization, which is rather consistent 
with an axiomatic characterization of human behavior than with its direct empirical obser-
vation (Selten, 1999). This type of approach has been severely challenged as an empirical 
account of behavior. Important critiques stem from interdisciplinary studies which integrate 
economics with findings from psychology, neurology, research on artificial intelligence and 
cognitive disciplines in general.11 Looking from the perspective of bounded rationality 
implies refraining from the assumption of perfect computational abilities and describing a 
decision process via simple dynamics and heuristics (Simon, 1955). By doing that, it challenges 
the benchmarks of perfect rationality by formulating behaviorally motivated hypotheses. 
Concerning the task of terminating a risky project of the type characterized in Section 3, 
individuals can be expected not to perfectly adjust their behavior to the degree of risk (as this 
would require fairly sophisticated computations) but rather to intuitively determine the time of 
disinvestment. Moreover, in addition to the already mentioned sunk cost fallacy (Ross and 
Staw, 1993) and escalation of commitment (Staw, 1981), there are numerous other behavioral 
phenomena that might influence the intuitive choice of a disinvestment trigger towards post-
ponement of this irreversible decision such as status-quo bias (Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988;  
 
                                                          
11  For a critical approach to perfect rationality assumptions see, e.g., Kahneman (2002), Gigerenzer and Selten 
(2001), Güth and Kliemt (2004b), March (1994), Simon (1990) and (1955). A more philosophical approach 
is discussed in, e.g., Kliemt (2001). 
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Kahneman et al., 1991), resistance to change (Grabitz, 1971), inaction inertia (Tykocinski and 
Pitman, 1998), inaction or omission bias (Ritov and Baron, 1992), decision avoidance 
(Anderson, 2003), and procrastination (O’Donogue and Rabin, 1999; 2001; Ferrari et al., 1995).  
The behavioral literature also describes tendencies that might point in the opposite direction: 
tendencies against keeping a status quo, such as variety seeking and action bias, but their 
occurrence has only been demonstrated in situations quite different from a disinvestment task: 
Burmeister and Schade (2005) experimentally demonstrate that a status quo bias might be 
overcompensated by variety-seeking tendencies only for ‘sensual’ objects such as perfume 
and Bar-Eli et al. (2007) demonstrate an action bias in a strategic situation in soccer games: 
reactions of goalkeepers in penalty kicks.  
Hence, our reasoning unambiguously leads to the formulation of the following behavioral 
hypothesis; note that to discriminate our behavioral from the normative propositions, we 
chose to label them differently starting with H1: 
H1: In a disinvestment task, individuals are waiting longer than optimal to terminate a 
project. 
In the present study, we call this behavior ‘psychological inertia’ to contrast this type of 
inertia with the ‘options-based’ type of inertia postulated in Propositions 1-3.  
A second behavioral effect we were interested in was to evaluate whether different volatility 
regimes drive different behaviors. It can be easily shown that an increase in the volatility of 
the project returns lowers the optimal disinvestment trigger. However, in our experiments we 
observe the disinvestment time. Increasing the volatility has two opposite effects on the 
optimal disinvestment time. On the one hand, the optimal disinvestment trigger decreases and 
on the other hand, the amplitude of the up and down movements of the random returns 
increases. Both effects have opposite consequences for the disinvestment time and hence, in 
our experimental setting the optimal disinvestment time in the low volatility treatment is, on 
average, only slightly smaller on average compared with the high volatility treatment (period 
4.14 in the high volatility scenario versus period 4.06 in the low volatility scenario). Thus 
from the real options perspective we expect similar disinvestment timings under both high 
and low volatility.  
On the other hand, individuals are known to be loss averse; a loss of the same magnitude has 
a much larger consequence on the evaluation of a risky option than a gain (Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). Since potential losses from waiting one period 
longer are larger under conditions of high volatility, we expect individuals to pay more 
attention to the fact that they are facing a random process, to consider the disinvestment 
problem more intensively and hence, to act closer to the real options prediction under 
conditions of high volatility. This leads to our second behavioral hypothesis:   
H2: Individuals acting under high volatility regime are more consistent with the real 
options benchmark than those under a low volatility regime.  
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Table 1 provides an overview of the benchmark propositions (P) and the behavioral hypo-
theses (H) that have been tested and also foreshadows the results to be reported in Section 6. 
To simplify the notation, it is henceforth referred to Real options as “RO” and net present 
value as “NPV.” The net present value theory becomes our null hypothesis (P0). 
Table 1.  Benchmark propositions, behavioral hypotheses, and overview of findings 
 1st study 
low volatility 
1st study 
high volatility 
2nd study 
high volatility Propositions and hypotheses: 
P0: Disinvestment behavior is consistent 
with classical investment theory Not supported Not supported Not supported 
P1: Disinvestment behavior is consistent 
with real options theory Supported Supported Supported 
P2: Decision makers consistent with the 
real options theory tolerate lower cash 
flows before terminating a project 
compared to classical investment theory 
Supported Supported Supported 
P3: The larger the individual risk aversion, 
the higher the disinvestment trigger, i.e. the 
more risk averse an individual, the earlier 
is disinvestment 
Not supported Not supported Not supported 
H1: Individuals are waiting too long to 
terminate a project, i.e., they are 
susceptible to psychological inertia 
Supported Supported Supported 
H2: Individuals acting under high volatility 
regime are more consistent with the RO 
benchmark 
Not supported Not supported n.a. 
 
It is evident that for numerous reasons it is by far easier to motivate non-entrepreneurs (many 
of them students) rather than entrepreneurs to participate in a laboratory study so that the 
larger study using both volatility treatments and a larger number of respondents facilitating 
statistical significance is run with non-entrepreneurs. We then carry out a laboratory 
experiment on a small sample of high-tech entrepreneurs to better motivate external validity 
of our results. There is much experimental evidence showing that entrepreneurs are biased or 
even more biased than other decision-makers (Busenitz and Barney, 1997; Olson, 1986; 
Forbes, 2005; Koellinger et al., 2007) and that there is already support for the idea of 
entrepreneurs persisting in an under-performing business and being prone to self-justification 
and escalation of commitment (DeTienne et al., 2008).  
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4. Experimental Setting 
In each round, the experimental task consisted of a problem of optimal stopping, stylizing a 
context-free choice to abandon a project for a constant termination value. Within each round, 
respondents could decide to stop in one of ten periods; and this task was repeated over 
multiple rounds. Relying on this design, we ran two different studies: in the first large scale 
experiment we compared the effects of different volatilities, while in the second small scale 
experiment we replicated the high volatility treatment with entrepreneurs.  
Both experiments were followed by a session of Holt and Laury (2002) lotteries with real 
payments in order to elicit risk attitudes of the participants. Lottery comparisons have been 
preferred over a certainty equivalent method because they permit avoiding possible 
distortions by a certainty effect (Levy and Levy, 2002). This method has also been favoured 
over psychometric scales (e.g., Zuckerman, 1971), as lottery comparisons are consistent with 
the experimental disinvestment task, being based on monetary choices under risk with real 
payoffs at stake. Returns from the existing project followed a binomial distribution with 
p=0.50 and no underlying drift in each round. First period revenues were always 1.000 points. 
To simplify matters for the participants, the risk-free interest rate was fixed at 10 %. Aban-
doning the project yielded constant revenue of 11.000 points, was allowed in each of 10 
periods and made compulsory in the last period. Note that there was an interest rate of 10 % 
applied to the disinvestment revenue of 11,000 in all periods after disinvestment, so that there 
was an opportunity cost of not disinvesting. 
The first experiment was carried out in two treatments (between subjects), differing in the size 
of potential gains and losses (referred to as volatility). Specifically, the potential gains and 
losses were 200 points in the low volatility and 500 points in the high-volatility treatment. 
The participants were informed about all parameters and assumptions underlying the 
experimental setting. The binomial tree of potential revenues together with the associated 
probabilities of occurrence was displayed on their screen. Respondents learned the 
development of payoffs (the outcome of the random process) from period to period. The tree 
was updated after each period based on the random outcome of this period and before the 
decision whether or not to disinvest had to be made. Choice was not time constrained.  
For each of the 20 rounds, the entire binomial tree was newly determined via a random 
mechanism. Hence, over the course of the entire experiment each respondent was confronted 
with 20 different, randomly determined paths of the binomial tree. The respondents did not 
receive immediate payoff feedback, except in the trial period. The random developments were 
separately determined for each individual. With no immediate payoff feedback and randomly 
determined paths of revenues, we limited reinforcement learning from outcomes. 
The final payoff was based on one of the 20 rounds (randomly chosen). The trial round gave 
the participants the opportunity to become acquainted with the experiment and to ask 
questions and was excluded from the determination of the payoff. The experiment was 
neutrally framed and presented as a problem of optimal stopping to isolate project termination 
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from other individual drivers and motives that may affect disinvestment and exit choices (for 
a translation of the instructions see the Appendix). 
The experiment was programmed in Z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and was run in August 2008 
in the stationary laboratory of a major German University. A total of 84 respondents (39 
undergraduate students of different schools and 37 non-students) participated in the 
experiment, i.e. 42 per treatment. Average earnings were 11.78 €. 
The second experiment was a replication of the high volatility treatment with high-tech 
entrepreneurs. The only differences were that, because of the higher opportunity cost of 
entrepreneurs, this group of respondents played only 10 instead of 20 rounds, i.e., were only 
confronted with 10 randomly chosen paths of the binomial tree, and that the incentives were 
upgraded for the same reason (700 points /€ instead of 3500 points /€). The experiment was 
run making use of a mobile laboratory in March 2009 with entrepreneurs from a business 
incubator in a major German city. The subject pool consisted of 15 founders of high-tech 
enterprises. 
As was the case in the study with non-entrepreneurs, we again presented the decision problem 
in abstract terms for the sake of comparability. At the end of the game-playing sessions, 
however, entrepreneurs were asked to state whether they have associated the experiment with 
some real-life situations. 
To illustrate the type of decision situation a participant was facing and to further motivate real 
options reasoning, Fig. 1 now depicts the two theoretical disinvestment triggers as well as a 
sample path of the random variable (an example for how such a development might have 
occurred) for the parameters chosen in our experiment. The first disinvestment trigger reflects 
the simple net present value criterion which amounts to a constant value of 1100 (red line). 
The second disinvestment trigger is based on the real options model (blue line). 
Fig. 1.  Disinvestment triggers and sample path of the random variable  
(high volatility scenario) 
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This graph, which is called an exercise frontier, starts at a value of about 500 and converges 
to the classical net present value trigger. According to the net present value criterion one 
should immediately disinvest in period zero, because the cash flow is 1000 < 1100. This 
decision deviates from the real options prediction. A decision maker who is consistent with 
the real options theory should disinvest in period five, because this is the first time where the 
cash flow falls below the exercise frontier. In other words, the two models come up with 
different predictions concerning the optimal disinvestment timing. A ‘psychological’ inertia 
would imply waiting even longer with the disinvestment than until period five.  
5. Experimental results 
The analysis of experimental results aimed at testing the benchmark propositions and the 
behavioral hypotheses stated above. The benchmark propositions and the behavioral 
hypotheses are labeled as in Table 1.  
5.1 Approach to data analysis 
Part of the data analysis is based on rank correlations (Kendall’s Tau) between observed and 
predicted choices, i.e., observed disinvestment times in the experiment and results from 
calculating the optimal disinvestment trigger via D2 for the respective random development of 
the binomial tree, across all rounds per individual. We interpret these correlations as 
indicators for general consistency between experimentally observed and theoretically 
predicted choices. The rank correlations indicate whether someone disinvests earlier if he/she 
should and later if he/she should according to the benchmark predictions in the different 
random developments of the project in the different rounds he/she is facing.  
We calculate another individual measure that reveals a different type of consistency with the 
real options benchmark, the general tendency of an individual towards psychological inertia 
in the sense of having a bias towards low or late disinvestment. We ran an analysis of 
variance with all individuals as factors (without intercepts) and with the inertia revealed by 
the disinvestment choices as dependent variables, i.e., observing whether disinvestment in the 
different rounds was consistent with the real options prediction (0), later than that (1), or 
earlier (-1). By this means, we obtain a measure of the individual propensity to hold on to a 
running investment for too long or in other words, a measure of the individual-level inertia 
over and above that part of waiting predicted by the real options approach. This indicator has 
values between -1 and 1 and will henceforth be labelled ‘predicted individual inertia’. The 
choice to rely on this measure instead of simply analyzing metric deviations from the 
theoretical benchmark is inspired by the asymmetric nature of the experimental data: 
Deviations from the real options benchmark can only be interpreted as a distance in case of 
late or consistent disinvestment. In case of early disinvestment this does not make much 
sense, as future developments of the random path (after the disinvestment decision has been 
made) are unknown to the subjects (see Fig. 1). 
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5.2 Laboratory experiment with non-entrepreneurs 
For the study with non-entrepreneur participants, the choices of 6 participants have been 
excluded from data evaluation, as they stated risk preferences that were inconsistent with a 
monotonicity requirement. Specifically, data analysis refers to 40 independent observations 
for the low-volatility treatment and 36 for the high-volatility treatment. Slightly more females 
than males participated in the experiment (23 vs. 17 in the low-volatility and 20 vs. 16 in the 
high-volatility treatment). The average age was, in both treatments, 29 years, ranging from 19 
to 67. 
Test of P0 and P2 
According to net present value, people should have disinvested right away; since the 
opportunity cost of not disinvesting was 1,100 and the expected value of revenues was only 
1,000 points per round. Overall, the results corroborate the hypothesis of late disinvestment 
(cf. Fig. 2) and provide evidence for the unsuitability of the net present value benchmark (P0, 
based on D1) as an account of actual behavior in our disinvestment scenario.  
Fig. 2.  Exit times for non-entrepreneurs/low volatility (left side), non-entre-
preneurs/high volatility (middle) and entrepreneurs/high volatility (right) 
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Average disinvestment times per subject over the 20 games equal, on average, 6.92 in the low 
and 6.99 in the high volatility treatment. These values are significantly different from zero  
(t-test, p < 0.001, for both treatments). Hence, respondents do not disinvest as soon as the 
liquidation value exceeds the project’s expected value in the sense of classical investment 
theory. 
The null hypothesis constituted by the NPV prediction is rejected for both treatments. At the 
same time, respondents’ late disinvestment offers support for P2. 
Empirically observed choices Theoretically predicted choices 
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Test of P1 and H2 
In order to test benchmark prediction P1 as well behavioral hypothesis H2, we focus on 
individual rank correlation coefficients between optimal disinvestment triggers and observed 
behaviors that provide an indicator for consistency between choice and real options 
benchmark.  
As Fig. 3 (left and middle distribution) shows, individuals’ behavior in the experiment results 
in a majority of positive correlations between the benchmark prediction applying D2 and 
observed behavior. The null hypothesis of non-correlation could be rejected for both 
volatilities (t-test, p<0.001), proving thus that the individual rank correlation coefficients are 
on average positive and significantly different from zero. Mean correlation coefficients are 
slightly higher under high volatility (0.22 vs. 0.18) but do not differ significantly (t-test; 
p>0.05). Since they are not significantly higher in the high-volatility treatment, H2 is not 
supported.  
Fig. 3.  Kendalls’ Tau correlations between RO-benchmark  
and choices per individual 
 
Caption: Group 1=“Non-Entrepreneurs; Low Volatility“, Group 2=“Non-Entrepreneurs;  
High Volatility“, Group 3=“Entrepreneurs; High Volatility“ 
Test of P3 and H1 
With non-entrepreneurs, the Holt and Laury lotteries reveal the predominance of risk 
aversion, which is consistent with previous experimental findings (see, e.g., Holt and Laury, 
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2002). Out of the 76 individuals whose choices did not violate monotonicity, 9.2% were risk 
seeking, 17.1% risk neutral, and 73.7% risk averse. 
As posited by P3, the more risk averse an individual, the earlier (in comparison to the decision 
rule D2) should he / she disinvest. This tendency would have to show up in the individual’s 
deviation of actual disinvestment from the benchmark triggers. Specifically, the more risk 
averse an individual, the more should he / she tend to early disinvestment compared to the 
risk neutral triggers calculated using D2.  
Looking again at Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 (left and middle diagrams), the experimental results 
provide strong evidence for psychological inertia going beyond what can be rationalized via 
an ‘options-based’ reasoning. Referring to Fig. 4, a tendency to late disinvestment is prevalent 
and there is a similar percentage of early and theory consistent disinvestment both under low 
and high volatility (respectively 18.8 % versus 18.9 % in the low-volatility treatment and 
20.3 % versus 21.9 % in the high-volatility treatment). This already gives a first indication of 
risk aversion not having an overall effect in the predicted direction.  
H1 stated that individuals tend to wait with the disinvestment for too long, i.e., wait more than 
indicated by an ‘options-based’ inertia. Looking at Fig. 4, late disinvestment (1) is much more 
prevalent than early (-1) or theory consistent disinvestment (0). This provides strong evidence 
for disinvestment inertia going beyond the real options benchmark. 
Fig. 4.  Inertia per group 
-1              0              1                    -1              0              1                     -1              0              1 
 
Caption: Group 1=“Non-Entrepreneurs; Low Volatility“, Group 2=“Non-Entrepreneurs;  
High Volatility“, Group 3=“Entrepreneurs; High Volatility“ 
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Fig. 5.  Predicted value for individual inertia 
 
Caption: Group 1=“Non-Entrepreneurs; Low Volatility“, Group 2=“Non-Entrepreneurs;  
High Volatility“, Group 3=“Entrepreneurs; High Volatility“ 
 
The fact that late disinvestment occurs in 62.4 % of cases under low volatility and in 57.8 % 
of the cases under high volatility clearly speak for a strong tendency towards psychological 
inertia. 
H1 can be further analyzed by relying on the indicator of ‘predicted individual inertia’ 
described in 5.1 whose distribution is represented in Fig. 5 (left and middle distribution). 
It clearly emerges that both in the high- and in the low-volatility treatment, only few 
respondents tend to early disinvestment (see the negative range in Fig. 5), while the large 
majority exhibits a tendency towards late disinvestment. Mean values of the indicator 
‘predicted individual inertia’ are 0.44 for the low- and 0.38 for the high-volatility treatment. 
Both coefficients are significantly positive (p < 0.001) and do not significantly differ from 
each other (p > 0.05).  
Hence, H1 is strongly supported and P3 positing the opposite direction for our majority of risk 
averse individuals is rejected.  
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Robustness checks 
A linear regression with the individual correlation coefficients as dependent and volatility, 
age, gender, and risk propensity (in the form of the number of safe choices in the Holt and 
Laury test) as independent variables yields no significant effects for any of the tested 
variables (p>0.10) showing that the general degree of consistency with the real options 
benchmark does not depend on either individual characteristics or volatility. The same result 
emerges based on regressions with the ‘predicted individual inertia’ coefficients as dependent 
and the same variables as independent variables. Hence, inertia is also independent of those 
factors. This underlines our above decision with respect to P3. It indicates that the tendency to 
disinvest too late or too early is independent of risk propensity.  
5.3 Small-scale laboratory experiment with high-tech entrepreneurs 
The second study investigates the behaviour of 15 high-tech entrepreneurs. Because of 
inconsistencies with the monotonicity requirement in the Holt and Laury session, the choices 
of 2 participants have not been considered in the data evaluation. The data analysis thus refers 
to a subject pool of 3 female and 10 male entrepreneurs, having made 10 decisions each 
yielding in 130 decisions. The average age was 43.7, ranging from 22 to 66. Four of the 
participants declared to have a second job. On average, they have been in business for 6.7 
years, with a minimum of 1 year to a maximum of 17 years of entrepreneurial activity. 
Average earnings amounted to 56.67 €. 
Test of P0 and P2 
Also among entrepreneurs, P0 is not supported by the experimental evidence (cf. Fig. 2, right 
distribution), as the average disinvestment occurs in period 6.91. Average disinvestment times 
of the entrepreneurs are significantly different from zero (t-test, p<0.001). Even though this 
was expected from a theoretical perspective, net present value is still a very common and easy 
to implement method to evaluate investments. Therefore, assuming entrepreneurs to be 
acquainted with investment and disinvestment decisions, it would not have been surprising to 
observe more consistency with P0 in the choice of some individuals. This was not the case, as 
disinvestment in the very first period only occurred 5 times, and none of the participants 
always disinvested in t =0. This also lends support for P2 within the group of entrepreneurs.  
Test of P1, P3, and H112,13 
With a mean correlation of 0.31, which is slightly higher than among non-entrepreneurs (a 
marginal significant difference in a one-sided test; t-test: p<0.10), entrepreneurs’ behavior 
                                                          
12  As explained in the experimental design section, entrepreneurs played only 10 instead of 20 games, so that 
entrepreneurs’ correlation coefficients and average deviation measures have been calculated on the basis of 
10 instead of 20 observations. 
13  As entrepreneurs only played under high-volatility regime, H2 does not apply and ´could not be tested. 
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exhibits a subtle tendency to be more consistent with real options reasoning (cf. Fig. 3). The 
null hypothesis of zero correlation can be rejected even in this small sample (t-test, p<0.01) 
lending further support to P1. Nevertheless, entrepreneurs are also prone to inertia going 
beyond benchmark predictions (52.3 % versus 57.8 % of non-entrepreneurs with high 
volatility) and similarly susceptible to early disinvestment (20.0 % versus 20.3 %, as 
represented in Fig. 4, middle and left diagrams). ‘Predicted individual inertia’ is significantly 
larger than zero (p<0.01) but does not significantly differ from that of the non-entrepreneurs 
(p>0.10).  
None of the entrepreneurs is a risk taker, 23.1% are risk neutral, and 76.9% are risk averse, 
according to the Holt and Laury test. The number of safe choices in this test is not 
significantly different between entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs (t-test, p>0.10). Hence, 
risk propensity seems not to differ between these two groups of individuals. A linear 
regression with entrepreneurs’ ‘predicted individual inertia’ coefficients as the dependent and 
age, gender, and risk propensity (number of safe choices in Holt and Laury test) as 
independent variables demonstrates none of these parameters to be statistically significant 
(p>0.10). Hence, risk propensity is again irrelevant for disinvestment timing lending no 
support to P3. 
Joint test of entrepreneurs’ and non-entrepreneurs’ consistency with the benchmark 
Figures 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 reveal a consistent pattern. Entrepreneurs are always slightly more 
consistent with the real options benchmark. They exhibit a smaller tendency to wait until the 
last period (Fig. 2), they show a smaller fraction of negative or zero rank correlations (Fig. 3), 
as a population, they exhibit a smaller fraction of late disinvestment choices (Fig. 3), and only 
one entrepreneur clearly tends to early disinvestment (Fig. 5). Figure 6 allows for a 
comparison of average responses across all three groups. Entrepreneurs are more consistent 
with the real options framework and ‘predicted individual inertia’ coefficients are smaller 
with entrepreneurs.  
Fig. 6.  Means of Kendalls’ tau and predicted value for inertia per group 
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Given the small number of entrepreneurs, it is actually quite difficult to achieve a clear 
statistical significance for those differences. However, and consistent with the above  
t-test results, the entrepreneur dummy variable (entrepreneur vs. non-entrepreneur) achieves 
marginal significance (one-sided) in an overall regression with individual rank correlations as 
dependent and risk propensity, gender, and volatility as independent variables. None of the 
other tested variables has a significant effect on the individual correlation coefficients 
(p>0.10). Although a marginal significance can be seen as indicating a tendency, a 
conservative interpretation of our findings dictates not to base our discussion and implications 
on this. But our results clearly offer no support to an idea of entrepreneurs being more biased 
or having a tendency to hold on with a losing activity than other individuals.   
Some entrepreneurs stated to have associated the experimental problem with a real-life 
situation. Specifically, they related it to technology marketing, customers’ willingness to pay, 
investment strategy, and profitability of continuation of an ongoing project. 
Final remark on learning 
As explicitly pursued by providing no direct payoff feedback after the disinvestment choices, 
no significant learning effects seem to have occurred in any of the treatments and / or studies. 
Exploring the occurrence of theory consistent choices in the different periods, we found no 
monotonic trend supporting the occurrence of learning. 
6. Discussion and implications 
Disinvestment and, in particular, entrepreneurial exit represent crucial decisions for business 
practice that involve substantial risk. Two alternative explanations are possible as to why 
individuals might postpone disinvestments: a rational account in line with real options 
reasoning as well as a behavioral account in line with a status quo bias, inaction inertia, and 
other psychological phenomena leading individuals to generally postpone or even avoid 
action. Since the implications of these two explanations for judging the adequacy of 
entrepreneurs’ disinvestment choices are quite different, the experiments carried out in the 
present contribution aimed at disentangling an ‘options-based’ from a ‘psychological’ inertia.  
The main findings from this experimental study are first that individuals do postpone taking 
an irreversible decision such as project termination even if the net present value is negative to 
start with, hence rejecting traditional investment theory and its myopic property as an account 
of actual human behavior. We also do not expect individuals to carry out the computations 
necessary to make disinvestment choices fully consistent with real options reasoning. 
However, we have evidence for many of them at least intuitively understanding the value of 
waiting and applying decision rules that result in choices somewhat consistent with those that 
would have resulted if they had applied such reasoning. 
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However, even though (intuitive) real options reasoning seems to be more appropriate to 
account for individuals’ behavior than the net present value approach, an ‘options-based’ 
inertia appears not to be the entire story. ‘Psychological inertia’ plays a central role in as a 
driver of disinvestment behavior and is not moderated by factors such as gender, age, and risk 
propensity.  
Although entrepreneurs’ behavior seems not to differ substantially from that of non-
entrepreneurs, a subtle tendency of the entrepreneurs to exhibit more options-like reasoning 
than non-entrepreneurs could be demonstrated. This is clearly opposed to any argument along 
the lines that entrepreneurs are especially prone to go on with a losing investment for too 
long. This result is fully consistent with the much simpler questionnaire experiments – not 
looking at disinvestment choices and not employing a multi-period framework – reported in 
Burmeister and Schade (2007) demonstrating that entrepreneurs are not more status quo 
biased than students, and that they are actually less status biased than bankers.  
In a real options framework, entrepreneurs’ behavior could also be consistent with risk taking. 
However, a tendency towards risk taking could neither be demonstrated by Elston et al. 
(2006) nor in our sample. Furthermore, risk propensity could be demonstrated to be simply 
not related to disinvestment choices with either high or low volatility or with entrepreneurs or 
non-entrepreneurs in our experiments. We admit that our measurement of risk propensity is 
not reflective of most risks outside the laboratory. However, it is consistent with our 
experimental task. This is necessary to give the measurement a fair chance to be predictive for 
behavior in our disinvestment task.  
Although entrepreneurs revealed slightly more consistency with real-options reasoning than 
non-entrepreneurs, they are still characterized by pronounced psychological inertia. Could 
there be anything reasonable with respect to this ‘irrational’ tendency? This question should 
be answered before suggesting potential ‘cures’ for this problem. Taking into account that our 
results refer to a sample of successful high-tech entrepreneurs, it might be argued that they 
have learned that it makes sense to pursue a project even in difficult times, i.e., that it might 
make sense to tolerate lower cash flows and wait before taking the irreversible decision of a 
disinvestment. The point is that people tend to bring their experience into the lab (Burns, 
1985) and perseverance is commonly considered to be not only a key to entrepreneurial suc-
cess, but rather a virtue for mankind in general: Where would astronomy be without 
Copernicus’ and Galileo’s stubbornness against all evidence and state of the art?  
The latter argument has a lot in common with an ‘ecological rationality’ argument (Gigerenzer 
and Goldstein, 1996; 2002): Could it be a smart heuristic to wait a bit longer before an 
irreversible choice is made than it appears to be rational at first sight? Besides our reasoning 
in favor of perseverance, there is another aspect favoring such behavior outside the laboratory. 
Uncertainty or ambiguity, surely a more accurate characterization of most entrepreneurial 
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decision situations than risk with known probabilities, could make waiting more valuable than 
with known probabilities.14  
Another aspect that is relevant for the implications we can draw from our study is the 
relatively low consistency between disinvestment choices and benchmark triggers with both 
entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs. One the one hand, significant correlations indicate that 
individuals somehow apply an ‘options-based’ intuition or reasoning. On the other hand, 
average coefficients below 0.50 are still quite low under conditions of high volatility given 
the importance of disinvestment choices for the financial success of this group of individuals. 
Hence, we believe that teaching ‘options-based’ reasoning to entrepreneurs as well as non-
entrepreneurs could lead to an improvement of their decision making.  
But is it actually possible to improve or even induce ‘options-based’ reasoning? As research 
on theory recursivity argues, it is important for effective consulting and advising to take into 
consideration the boundedly rational processing of knowledge and information when teaching 
theories (Güth and Kliemt, 2004a; 2004b; Sandri, 2009). It is especially hard to equip, e.g., 
individuals with counterintuitive concepts such as mixed strategies and one has to come up 
with smart ideas how to translate such concepts into practical advice. In this regard, however, 
our experiment is quite encouraging since, even though for some individuals the correlations 
between options benchmark and choices are quite low or even negative, it provides some 
evidence of an existing affinity between a real options perspective and individuals’ intuitive 
reasoning one could build up upon. 
7. Limitations and Future Research 
As already pointed out, the experimental examination and testing of real options settings is in 
its beginning and experimental evidence on behavior with abandonment options other than the 
present study is, to the best of our knowledge, lacking. Moving on a rather unexplored terrain, 
we consider our study a small but important first step on the way towards a better 
understanding and rationalizing of termination choices. A lot of work remains to be done in 
order to better understand what kinds of heuristics might exactly drive different individuals’ 
decision making in disinvestment situations.  
Among the limitations of the current experimental setting (which we were aware of and 
whose potential disadvantages we carefully pondered in advance), are the discrete modeling 
of returns from the existing project and the identity of the myopic NPV prediction with an 
extreme (period 0). While continuous returns would have enriched our understanding of 
behavior (in particular concerning the heuristics applied), discrete returns have been adopted 
in order to keep the setting as clear and easy to understand as possible. The location of the 
NPV prediction was inspired by the necessity to separate this prediction enough from the 
                                                          
14  We are grateful to Gerd Gigerenzer for suggesting this explanation.   
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options benchmarks whilst keeping volatility within a moderate range. However, results 
revealed this potential frailty of the chosen design not to matter much as most choices fell 
wide apart from the NPV predictions. 
Concerning the experiment with entrepreneurs, the main limitation is the small sample size. 
Only larger sample sizes would help substantiating the differences between entrepreneurs and 
non-entrepreneurs towards a clear level of significance. It is however quite difficult to 
motivate successful high-tech entrepreneurs to take part in a controlled experimental study 
despite the availability of a mobile laboratory. Nevertheless, we were able to collect 10 
disinvestment choices with each entrepreneur participating in our study, resulting in 130 
usable entrepreneurial decisions. 
Further research in the vein of this study should investigate the effect of framing on 
disinvestment choices: Will individuals be more ‘attached’ to a project that is framed in 
realistic terms? Another interesting path to be taken is testing the disinvestment behavior of 
other groups of individuals. An exciting endeavor, e.g., is testing the behavior of farmers, as 
they have been alleged to be particularly conservative and averse to changes (Jose and 
Crumly, 1993; Odening et al., 2005). The experimental results also signal the need to 
disentangle the effects of the different potential drivers of ‘psychological inertia’, i.e., status 
quo bias, reluctance to change, escalation of commitment etc., in further studies. The study by 
DeTienne et al. (2008) is already an important contribution along this path. However, we could 
like to see the results that would emerge keeping our incentive compatible experimentation 
methodology. Finally, it is clearly worth pursuing the ecological rationality interpretation of 
late disinvestment. Experiments implementing uncertainty or ambiguity might be an 
appropriate step towards a better understanding of the relevance of this explanation and 
helping to weigh this perspective against the occurrence of ‘psychological inertia’ as a bias in 
a scenario closer to the characteristics of the actual business world.  
8. Conclusion 
This study provides experimental evidence for entrepreneurs as well as non-entrepreneurs 
understanding the value of waiting in disinvestment decisions and for being partially in tune 
with an ‘options-based’ reasoning. But we have also strong evidence for a ‘psychological 
inertia’ occurring, individuals tend to postpone disinvestment for longer than ‘options-based’ 
reasoning would advise them to do.  
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Appendix: Experimental instructions 
 
Translation from German, instructions for study with non-entrepreneurs,  
high-volatility treatment 
 
General information 
[…] Please read all instructions carefully as your earnings from the experiment will depend on your decisions. 
At the end of the experiment you will receive your earnings in cash. 
Feel free to use pen, scratch paper, and calculator available on your desk. 
Please remain seated and do not communicate with other participants during the experiment. 
 
First Part 
The first part of the experiment consists of a trial game, followed by 20 repetitions of the same game. The trial 
game is played to make you familiar and more confortable with the game. The trial won’t be considered for 
payment. 
Each game consists of 11 rounds. 
In each game you should try to get as many points as possible as your earnings are proportional to the number of 
points you get during the experiment. 
For each 3,500 points, you get 1 Euro. 
At the end of the experiment, one of the 20 games will be randomly chosen by the computer and you will be paid 
according to your individual score (i.e., the number of points you have accumulated) in this selected game. 
 
Introduction to the game 
In each game you will start with a score of 1,000 points in Round 0. In the next round (Round 1) and in any 
subsequent round: 
- Your points can either increase by 500 points with a probability of 50 %,  
- Or they can decrease by 500 points, also with a probability of 50 %. 
For example, from Round 0 to Round 1, in 50 % of the cases your points will increase to 1,500 points 
(1,000+500), or, in the remaining 50 % of the cases, they will decrease to 500 points (1,000-500). 
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In the diagram, you can see an example for this 
dynamics for three rounds: 
The probability of occurrence of a certain score 
is written below the respective score in 
parentheses. 
Round 0 Round 1 Round 2 … 
  2000  
  (25%)  
    
 1500   
 (50%)   
    
  1000  
1000  (25%)  
(100%)  1000  
  (25%)  
    
 500   
 (50%)   
    
  0  
  (25%)  
 
 
The situation can also be represented in a 
simpler form. The only difference is that for 
Round 2, the score of 1,000 appears just once 
and its probability of occurrence equals the sum 
of the probabilities that were separately listed in 
the diagram above. 
In the following, we will use this form of 
representation throughout. 
 
Round 0 Round 1 Round 2 … 
  2000  
  (25%)  
    
 1500   
 (50%)   
    
    
1000  1000  
(100%)  (50%)  
    
    
 500   
 (50%)   
    
  0  
  (25%)  
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Your screen 
You can see the potential developments of your points from round to round on your PC-screen. These 
developments will be represented in the following form: 
Round 0 Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 Round 5 Round 6 Round 7 Round 8 Round 9 Round 10
1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500 4000 4500 5000 5500 6000
100,00% 50,00% 25,00% 12,50% 6,25% 3,13% 1,56% 0,78% 0,39% 0,20% 0,10%
 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500 4000 4500 5000
 50,00% 50,00% 37,50% 25,00% 15,63% 9,38% 5,47% 3,13% 1,76% 0,98%
  0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500 4000
  25,00% 37,50% 37,50% 31,25% 23,44% 16,41% 10,94% 7,03% 4,39%
   -500 0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000
   12,50% 25,00% 31,25% 31,25% 27,34% 21,88% 16,41% 11,72%
    -1000 -500 0 500 1000 1500 2000
    6,25% 15,63% 23,44% 27,34% 27,34% 24,61% 20,51%
     -1500 -1000 -500 0 500 1000
     3,13% 9,38% 16,41% 21,88% 24,61% 24,61%
      -2000 -1500 -1000 -500 0
      1,56% 5,47% 10,94% 16,41% 20,51%
       -2500 -2000 -1500 -1000
       0,78% 3,13% 7,03% 11,72%
        -3000 -2500 -2000
        0,39% 1,76% 4,39%
         -3500 -3000
         0,20% 0,98%
          -4000
          0,10%
 
This table can be interpreted as follows: 
In the first round (Round 0) you receive 1,000 points (shown in italics in the diagram). The points you may realize 
in the next rounds are written in bold. The probabilities of occurrence of the scores are listed under the respective 
score. 
 
 
Assume that in Round 1, your score increased from 1,000 to 1,500 points. Then the scores that are written in 
italics are no longer possible, i.e., their probability of occurrence is 0. 
In this case, your PC-screen will look the following way: 
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Round 0 Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 Round 5 Round 6 Round 7 Round 8 Round 9 Round 10 
1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500 4000 4500 5000 5500 6000 
0,00% 100,00% 50,00% 25,00% 12,50% 6,25% 3,13% 1,56% 0,78% 0,39% 0,20% 
 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500 4000 4500 5000 
 0,00% 50,00% 50,00% 37,50% 25,00% 15,63% 9,38% 5,47% 3,13% 1,76% 
  0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500 4000 
  0,00% 25,00% 37,50% 37,50% 31,25% 23,44% 16,41% 10,94% 7,03% 
   -500 0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 
   0,00% 12,50% 25,00% 31,25% 31,25% 27,34% 21,88% 16,41% 
    -1000 -500 0 500 1000 1500 2000 
    0,00% 6,25% 15,63% 23,44% 27,34% 27,34% 24,61% 
     -1500 -1000 -500 0 500 1000 
     0,00% 3,13% 9,38% 16,41% 21,88% 24,61% 
      -2000 -1500 -1000 -500 0 
      0,00% 1,56% 5,47% 10,94% 16,41% 
       -2500 -2000 -1500 -1000 
       0,00% 0,78% 3,13% 7,03% 
        -3000 -2500 -2000 
        0,00% 0,39% 1,76% 
         -3500 -3000 
         0,00% 0,20% 
          -4000 
          0,00% 
 
As you can see, the probabilities of occurrence of the scores have changed. In fact, they change in each round, i.e., 
they depend on the outcome(s) in the previous round(s). 
 
Your decision and your profit 
In each round you may: 
- let your point score accumulate as described above (i.e., stay in the game) 
- or terminate the game and accept a lump-sum payment of 11,000 points (eleven-thousand) (i.e., leave the 
game). 
The total number of points you carry on to each subsequent round increases by 10 % for each round left in the 
game (irrespective of whether you play all rounds or not), i.e., your total score will increase by one tenth and is 
then added to the points you will receive in the subsequent rounds. You can think of this increase as an interest 
payment. 
The interest rate also applies to the lump-sum payment of 11,000 points, after you have left the game. It is added 
to the points you have collected until you decided to leave the game. Starting from the round in which you decide 
to terminate the game, this sum increases by 10 % for each of the remaining rounds.  
Assume, you decided to terminate the game in Round X and receive 11,000 points. 
Then your total score at the end of the game consists of: 
- All points you have received before this round, increased by 10 % per round after you received them until 
round 10 
- Plus 11,000 points you get because you have decided to leave the game. The 11,000 points also increase 
by 10 % for each of the remaining rounds (i.e., from Round X to Round 10). 
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If you stay in the game until the last round (i.e., play the entire game from Round 0 to Round 10), you 
automatically get 11,000 points at the end of the game (i.e., in Round 10). 
 
Consider the following example: 
 
Example 
 
Imagine you received the points printed in italics: 
 
Round 0 Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 … 
1000 1500 2000 2500 
 500 1000 1500 
  0 500 
   -500 
 
In this case your total score is equal to: 
- The 1,000 points you received in Round 0 increased by 10 % for each of the remaining 10 
rounds of the game, i.e., 10
10
1000 1.1 1.1 ... 1.1 1000 1.1 2593.7
times
        
- Plus the 500 points you received in Round 1 increased by 10 % for each of the remaining 9 
rounds, i.e., 9
9
500 1.1 1.1 ... 1.1 500 1.1 1179
times
        
- Plus the 1000 points of Round 2 increased by 10 % for each of the remaining 8 rounds, i.e., 
8
8
1000 1.1 1.1 ... 1.1 1000 1.1 2143.6
times
        
- Plus the 1500 points of Round 3 increased by 10 % for each of the remaining 7 rounds, i.e., 
7
7
1500 1.1 1.1 ... 1.1 1500 1.1 2923.1
times
        
- Plus the 11000 points you received in addition in Round 3 (because you decided to leave the 
game in this round) also increased by 10 % for each of the remainning 7 rounds, i.e., 
7
7
11000 1.1 1.1 ... 1.1 11000 1.1 21435.9
times
        
Therefore, your total score in this game equals to: 
2593.7 1179 2143.6 2923.1 21435.9 30275.3      points  
[…] 
38 Serena Sandri, Christian Schade, Oliver Mußhoff, and Martin Odening 
SiAg-Working Paper 2/2 (2010); HU Berlin 
About the Authors 
Dr. Serena Sandri is research associate for the research project “Experiments on entrepreneurial 
decision-making” that is part of the research group “Structural change in agriculture”, funded 
by the German Research Foundation (DFG). Her major research areas are experimental 
economics, behavioral economics, and entrepreneurial decision making. 
Address: 
Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin 
School of Business and Economics 
Institute for Entrepreneurial Studies and Innovation Management 
Rosenstraße 19 
10178 Berlin, Germany 
E-mail: serena.sandri@wiwi.hu-berlin.de 
 
Prof. Dr. Christian Schade is director of the Institute for Entrepreneurial Studies and 
Innovation Management at Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin. He is head of the project 
“Experiments on entrepreneurial decision making” that is part of the research group “Structural 
change in agriculture”, funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG). Furthermore, he is 
head of the research project „Innovation and coordination“ funded by the Volkswagen 
Foundation which is a collaborative effort with Columbia University and the German Institute 
for Economic Research (DIW Berlin). Since 2002, he is a research professor at the DIW Berlin 
and since 2006 associate editor of the Journal of Business Venturing (Elsevier). His research is 
based on economic psychology. Preferred fields of application are entrepreneurship and 
innovation research. Methodologically Christian Schade concentrates on laboratory experiments, 
descriptive decision theory, and game theory. 
Address: 
Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin 
School of Business and Economics 
Institute for Entrepreneurial Studies and Innovation Management 
Rosenstraße 19 
10178 Berlin, Germany 
E-mail: schade@wiwi.hu-berlin.de 
 
 Holding on for too long? 39 
SiAg-Working Paper 2/2 (2010); HU Berlin 
Prof. Dr. Oliver Mußhoff is Professor of Agricultural Economics at the Universitaet 
Goettingen. The main area of research interest is farm management. He has published various 
articles on investment, finance, and risk management. 
Address: 
Universität Göttingen 
Department of Agricultural and Rural Development 
Farm Management 
Platz der Göttinger Sieben 5 
37073 Göttingen 
E-mail: oliver.musshoff@agr.uni-goettingen.de 
 
Prof. Dr. Martin Odening holds the chair for Farm Management at Humboldt-Universität zu 
Berlin. He is head of the department of Agriculture Economics and coordinator of the DFG 
research unit “Structural Change in Agriculture”. His research activities focus on investment 
and finance in agriculture, risk analysis, and efficiency analyses. 
Address: 
Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin 
Faculty of Agriculture and Horticulture 
Department of Agricultural Economics  
Philippstraße 13 
10115 Berlin, Germany 
E-mail: m.odening@agrar.hu-berlin.de 

 SiAg-Working Paper 2/2 (2010); HU Berlin 
SiAg-Working Paper 
SiAg Working Papers are published by the DFG research group “Structural Change in Agriculture”. The 
series comprises papers from research group members as well as from external authors with a focus on 
structural change in the agricultural sector. 
 
Editorial office 
Dr. Astrid Häger (Managing editor) 
e-mail: astrid.haeger@agrar.hu-berlin.de  
phone: +49-30-2093.6062 
Kerstin Oertel (Layout) 
e-mail: k.oertel@agrar.hu-berlin.de  
phone: +49-30-2093.6340 
Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin  
Landwirtschaftlich-Gärtnerische Fakultät  
Department für Agrarökonomie 
FG Agrarpolitik 
Philippstr. 13, Haus 12A 
10099 Berlin (Germany 
 
SiAg-Working Paper Series 
For a complete list of Working Papers published by the DFG-Forschergruppe 986, please visit 
http://edoc.hu-berlin.de/browsing/series/index.php?l[2]=Einrichtungen&l[3]=Landwirtschaftlich-G%C3%A 
4rtnerische+Fakult%C3%A4t&c[3][corp_id]=1002000&l[4]=SiAg+Working+Paper+-&c[4][series_id]=28852 
&_=8a5a8a2c8793d5e9e525e27ba8b4ffa7. 
 
01 The disciplinary influence of physics, biology, and chemistry on economic modelling:  
Overview and implications for understanding agricultural change.  
Martin Petrick (February 2008) 
02/2 Holding on for too long? 
An experimental study on inertia in entrepreneurs’ and non-entrepreneurs’ disinvestment choices 
Serena Sandri, Christian Schade, Oliver Mußhoff, and Martin Odening (updated January 2010) 
03 The Role of Small Farms in Structural Change.  
Silke Hüttel and Anne Margarian (June 2009) 
04 Characterizing the female entrepreneur:  
Comparing behavior in a market entry experiment with other groups of individuals 
Christian Schade, Sabrina Boewe, and Kai Krause (April 2009) 
05 Does vertical integration reduce investment reluctance in production chains? 
An agent-based real options approach 
Alfons Balmann, Oliver Musshoff and Karin Larsén (September 2009) 
06 The regional specifity of structural change in agriculture 
An assessment of the role of farmers’ strategic behaviour on the land market 
Anne Margarian (September 2009) 
07 Programming rural development funds –   
An interactive linear programming approach applied to the EAFRD program in Saxony-Anhalt  
Julia Schmid, Astrid Häger, Kurt Jechlitschka and Dieter Kirschke (January 2010) 
